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UNIONS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA: LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS
TO CONTROL UNION PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS
by Gary R. Rice
Unions have been active in the political sphere to varying degrees since
their formation. In one of the earliest instances of such union political
activity, the Mechanics Union of Trade Associations in Philadelphia pro-
posed working to elect candidates "to represent the interests of the work-
ing class."' Although many local labor parties were subsequently formed,
by 1832 most were disbanded as a result of factional differences. Due to a
general decline in trade unionism, the unions of the pre-Civil War period
concerned themselves primarily with immediate economic issues. The Na-
tional Labor Union which was formed in 1866, nominated a presidential
candidate in the election of 1872, but the union was absorbed by the
Greenback Labor Party six years later.' Meanwhile, the Knights of Labor,
which was originally formed as an organization of garment workers, had
risen to national prominence. Its membership subsequently declined, how-
ever, because of its over-diversity, lack of leadership, and association with
the Haymarket Riot of 1886.' During this period the American Federation
of Labor was formed. The Federation was devoted to seeking its aims out-
side of the political sphere and resisted pressure to form a labor party. It
did, however, enter the political arena by working for particular candi-
dates.' A long-standing dispute within the AFL over industrial unions led
to the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1938.
This new union was more politically oriented and formed an organization
designed to further the election of favorable candidates." With the mer-
ger in 1955 of the two organizations as the AFL-CIO, the Committee for
Political Education was organized to collect voluntary contributions from
union members for political activities.'
To keep unions completely out of politics is probably impossible. Unions
have grown largely as a result of protective federal legislation, and because
they are, in a sense, quasi-public organizations, it is unreasonable to expect
them to risk their very existence by abstaining from political involvement.
In addition to furthering protective legislation, it has been suggested' that
union political activity is motivated by the effect of such activity on the
creation of jobs,' the regulation of wages and hours, the maintenance
1 H. FAULKNER & M. STARR, LABOR IN AMERICA 45 (1957).
a S. COHEN, LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 66 (1966).
'H. FAULKNER & M. STARR, LABOR IN AMERICA 89 (1957).
4 Id. at 96-99.
'Od. at 117.
Old. at 161.
7 Id. at 322.
8 Barbash, Unions, Government and Politics, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 66 (1947).
'The federal government is a great generator of employment, both through defense spending
and public works. Workers in these industries are directly affected by changes in governmental
spending policy.
'0 Wage and hour regulation decreases the competition created by unorganized workers with
lower wages.
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of health and safety standards," and the economic stabilization of various
industries. 2
Due to the Democratic Party's general orientation, outside the South
at least, toward "liberalism" and "pro-unionism," most union financial
support has been directed to Democratic candidates. During the 1968 elec-
tion year, labor unions spent an officially reported four million dollars on
political campaigns. Of that amount the greatest portion was spent on
pro-union candidates for local offices, rather than the presidential candi-
dates. At least one source has suggested that unions spend perhaps as much
as sixty-two million dollars a year on political activity. 4 As long as the re-
porting system remains inadequate, however, the debate over how much
money is actually spent will remain unsettled. It is not the purpose of this
Comment to discuss the proper role of unions in politics. Rather this
Comment will focus on the legislative attitude towards union political
activity as expressed in section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act" and the
various state acts regulating such activity. It will further analyze the
statutes' ability to fulfill their respective objectives, and then offer cer-
tain suggestions for legislative regulation of union political activity.
I. SECTION 304 OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
The Background of Section 304. Union participation in political elections
aroused little interest at the turn of the century. The focus of attention
on the political activities of corporations,0 however, subsequently resulted
in the passage of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act." This Act prohibited
a corporation from making a money contribution in connection with a
federal election. Congressional concern with union activity remained slight
until 1936 when a congressional committee reported large union donations
in the election campaign of that year." Legislation concerning union po-
litical activity was not enacted, however, until section 9 of the War La-
bor Disputes Act was passed in 1943.'9 In addition, the scope of this
legislation was limited since it excluded primary elections and outlawed
only direct contributions. Because the War Labor Disputes Act was only
temporary, as World War II drew to a close a need for permanent labor
reform arose. The activities of the United Mine 'Workers ° and the war-
" Most prominent in this field is the United Mine Workers which has sought both federal
and state inspection laws.
'2 Unions sometimes work for government-regulated prices to keep employment high.
aBy comparison, unions spent a reported 2.5 million dollars in 1960, 1.8 million dollars in
1956, and 2.0 million dollars in 1952 on political activity. U.S. NEws, Nov. 11, 1968, at 84.
14White, Why Shold Labor's Leaders Play Politics with the Worker's Money, READER'S Di-
GEST, Oct. 1958, at 157, citing a statement by Rep. Ralph Guinn of New York.
'518 U.S.C. § 610 (1964).
"
6 See J. SHANNON, MONEY AND POLITICS 31-33 (1959).
"7Act of Jan. 26, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Star. 864.
s Kovarsky, Unions and Federal Elections-A Social and Legal Analysis, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J.
358, 371 (1968).
1'Act of June 25, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163.
20 John L. Lewis led his mine workers on a walkout over the union security issue. Although
the National Defense Mediation Board, established by presidential order in March of 1941, voted
against allowing the strike, it was unable to stop the walkout. Shortly thereafter the Board was
abolished. S. COHEN, LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (1966).
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time strikes2' had created an atmosphere conducive to labor legislation.2
These factors, combined with a general conservative swing throughout the
country, resulted in public demand for governmental regulation of labor.3
The election of 1946 gave the Republicans control of Congress and set
the stage for the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Representative Hartley introduced H.R. 3020, which contained a pro-
vision that was to become the basis of the enacted section 304, on April
10, 1947.4 Despite the prevalent threat of legislation restricting union
activity, there was no united labor position concerning what should or
should not be included in the legislation."5 After the Senate and House
passed bills with differing provisions," a conference committee was cre-
ated to resolve the differences." The resulting conference report, which
contained section 304, was passed by the House with only one hour's de-
bate, and the Senate passed the Taft-Hartley Act after only two days of
debate." The enacted section 304 reads in part as follows:
It is unlawful for . . . any labor organization to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resi-
dent Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with
any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candi-
dates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political commit-
tee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this
section."
The final part of the section provides fines for unions, for their officers
and directors, and for any person who receives the money. Additional
fines are imposed for willful violations."
The legislative history of section 304 is not extensive. The Taft-Hartley
Act was a complex piece of legislation and other sections merited more
attention. The House Education and Labor Committee report carried only
a one paragraph summary of section 304 indicating that (1) unions were
subject to the provisions, and (2) expenditures as well as contributions
were prohibited." The primary legislative history of the Act is found in a
"1There were some 4,557 work stoppages with a resulting loss of 23.5 million man hours dur-
ing the war period. Id. at 126.
"A. McADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION 27-28 (1964). Although strikes
cause great inconvenience to the public during peacetime, during wartime they have the added
disadvantage of appearing unpatriotic.
"S Most states had already amended their own "Baby Wagoner Acts" to regulate unions as well
as employers. S. COHEN, LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 484 (1966).
249 3 CONG. REC. 3400 (1947).
25 A. McADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION 27-28 (1964).
2693 CONG. REc. 3747-48, 5298 (1947). The Senate bill had no section concerning political
contributions.
2793 CONG. REC. 5413, 5298 (1947).
2"93 CONG. REC. 6537-49, 6593-615, 6654-93 (1947).
"9 18 U.S.C. S 610 (1964). Section 304 also subjects corporations to the same regulations as
are applied to unions.
°See 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 723.
" The term "willful" is not defined in the statute, but has been defined by a federal court to
mean "that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing." Dennis v. United States,
171 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
" CONFERENCE REPORT LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, H.R. REP. No. 510,
80th COng., 1st Sess. 67 (1947).
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series of exchanges between Senator Taft and his colleagues."3 The thrust
of Senator Taft's remarks was that a labor union should not be allowed to
use members' dues for political causes in which they may not believe. Little
mention was made of any corrupting effect of union money, which was
the reason most prominent in the public's mind for the existence of sec-
tion 304. Clearly, both arguments can be recognized as legislative pur-
poses inherent in the section. 4
The Early Years Under Section 304. Labor immediately set out to test the
constitutionality of section 3 0 4 .8" The first case to deal with the newly-
enacted section was United States v. CIO.' The CIO News, a periodical
published by the union and distributed to its members, was financed by
CIO funds. The source of the funds, however, was unclear. The front
page of the News had carried an editorial by CIO president Philip Murray
urging a vote for a certain candidate for Congress. In addition to normal
distribution, a thousand extra copies were sent to the regional CIO direc-
tor, apparently to be used in the election campaign. An indictment was
returned charging the CIO and its president with a violation of section
304. The United States District Court sustained a motion to dismiss, re-
marking "that no clear and present danger to the public interest can be
found in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this legisla-
tion.""7 An appeal was made directly to the United States Supreme Court.8
Rather than passing on the constitutionality of the section, the court
chose to rely upon statutory construction. It held that the key word
"expenditure" did not apply to house organs published for union mem-
bers only. The Court first noted that "expenditure" was not a word of
art and that its meaning, therefore, must be ascertained from the congres-
sional intent in passing the statute. The Court quoted extensively from
the Senate debates, even citing an exchange between Senators Pepper and
Taft which clearly indicated that, in fact, the section was intended to
prohibit the publication of union newspapers containing an editorial posi-
tion concerning candidates for public office if the distribution and publi-
cation expenses were paid from union dues."' Despite this evidence of con-
3393 CONG. REC. 6593-98, 6603-07 (1947).
'A federal court has subsequently held that both were purposes of § 304. United States v.
Lewis Food Co., 236 F. Supp. 849 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
" H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGONER ACT TO THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 596 (1950).
86335 U.S. 106 (1948).
" United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1948). The clear and present danger test
originated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It is not clear whether this test con-
tinues to be applied in its pure form. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
"The appeal was made under a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 682 (1947), now 18 U.S.C. 5
3731 (1964), allowing direct appeals from dismissals of indictments based on the invalidity of
a federal statute.
a' Mr. Barkley. Let us suppose a labor organization publishes a newspaper for the
information and benefit of its members, and let us suppose that it is published
regularly . .. and is paid for from a fund created by the payment of dues into
the organization it represents . . . Does the Senator from Ohio advise us that under
this measure such a newspaper could not take an editorial position with respect
to any candidate for public office, without violating this measure?
Mr. Taft. If it is supported by union funds, I do not think it could.
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gressional intent, the Court held that a periodical distributed solely to
union members' could be published even though it contained an article
advocating the election of a particular candidate for office. The Court also
advanced the argument that since members knew that it was the practice
of unions to publish house organs and with this knowledge they neverthe-
less became associated with these organizations, they were in no position
to complain.
Justice Rutledge, in a concurring opinion, attacked the leading opinion
for ignoring the legislative history of the Act. He stated that the major-
ity's interpretation "is not construction under the doctrine of strict neces-
sity. It is invasion of the legislative process by emasculation of the sta-
tute."'" The Justice noted that statutes restricting constitutional freedoms
must be narrowly drawn to meet the precise evils found by Congress.' In
pointing out that majority rule is a firmly established principle in unions,
Justice Rutledge reasoned that if minority rights are the primary concern,
it would be better to simply allow the minority to refrain from paying
that portion of its dues allocated to activities which the minority opposed. 4
Furthermore, while Congress could find that unrestricted expenditures by
unions for political activities might be undesirable, this did not mean it
had the power to outlaw all expenditures, since to do so would deprive
"the electorate of information, knowledge, and opinion vital to its func-
tion."
The next challenge to section 304 came the following year in United
States v. Painters Local 481.' In that case a small union in Connecticut
purchased radio time for $32.50 and newspaper ads for $111.14 to discour-
93 CONG. REC. 6595 (1947). A second passage was cited in the appendix to the concurring opinion
of Justice Rutledge, 335 U.S. at 157-58.
Mr. Barkley. So if there is a labor organization which is publishing a newspaper
. . . and if the expenses of that publication and distribution are paid from the
funds raised by means of payment of dues .. . then in order for that newspaper to
take any position with respect to any candidate, it would have to charge a sub-
scription ....
Mr. Taft. I am inclined to think so.
Another indication of the general understanding of the meaning of § 304 was found in the
comment of President Truman in his veto message: "This provision would prevent the ordinary
union newspaper from commenting favorably or unfavorably upon candidates or issues in national
elections." 93 CONG. REC. 7503 (1947).
"0 The Court misstated the fact situation since the indictment concerned itself with the extra
copies of the magazine which were intended for distribution in the election campaign, as well as
those intended for the regular distribution to CIO members.
41335 U.S. at 139.42 d. at 141.
4
Id. at 149. See Machinists Union v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); text accompanying notes
120-23 infra.
44335 U.S. at 144. The CIO case could have been decided on the basis that only a small sum
of money was involved in the extra copies, and that there is no public concern with a few dollars.
See Kovarsky, Unions and Federal Elections-A Social and Legal Analysis, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J.
358, 378 (1968). Such reasoning ignores, however, the fact that the indictment was based not
only upon the extra copies published, but also the normal distribution of the magazine.
4579 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949). Before the Painters
case arose Walter Reuther filed an action before the District Court of the District of Columbia
to obtain a declaratory judgment that § 304 was unconstitutional. Reuther v. Clark, 14 CCH
Lab. Cas. 5 64,503 (D.D.C. 1948). The request was denied by a three-judge panel despite the fact
that a classic case for declaratory judgment was presented. The complaint alleged that the union
had conducted activities which were apparently within the terms of the statute, that further
activities of this type were planned, and that the Attorney General had threatened the union with
prosecution.
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age support for Senator Robert Taft's presidential candidacy. The district
court wrote an extensive opinion upholding the indictment as charging an
offense under section 304 and upholding the section as constitutional.
Painters was distinguished from CIO on the basis that the latter was con-
cerned only with the limited fact situation of that case.' It was clear to the
court that this was the type of expenditure sought to be prohibited by the
Act." Finding this, the court further held that "the right of the people by
free elections to keep the control of their own government is truly funda-
mental and preponderant over even the freedoms of the First Amend-
ment."'" The court reasoned that groups with great economic power have
the potential to control the nation if allowed to proceed unchecked. There-
fore, when balanced against even first amendment freedoms, it was ap-
parent that the regulation should be allowed.4 '
The United States Court of Appeals, however, viewed the indictment
quite differently and dismissed it as not stating an offense under the sta-
tute. 0 The court viewed the number of people affected as the critical fac-
tor. It stated: "It is hard to imagine that a greater number of people
would be affected [by the publicity here] than by publication in the union
periodical dealt with in the CIO litigation."'" Further, since the union had
no newspaper, "the daily press [and] radio was as natural a way of com-
municating its views to its members as by a newspaper of its own."'" The
court apparently misinterpreted the CIO case, however, since Justice Reed
had clearly attempted to differentiate between house organs and general
circulation newspapers."
The final case in this early period was United States v. Laborers Local
2 64.' In that case the union supplied men and automobiles to help in the
campaign of the union business agent for a political office. Some of the
expenditures had been used for registering voters and transporting them
to the polls. The government was unable to present evidence separating
these expenditures from the ones directly benefiting the candidate. The
district court noted the importance of having as many people as possible
registered to vote" and concluded that Congress had not intended to cur-
tail activities which further this goal. The court concluded that the other
expenditures in behalf of the candidate constituted "an uncertain, insig-
4' The court merely repeated the factual differences between the two cases.
4779 F. Supp. at 521. The court did not cite any congressional debates, but an exchange be-
tween Senators Pepper and Taft makes it clear that this situation was intended to be covered.
"Mr. Pepper: [W]ould it be forbidden by this proposed act to pay for any radio time, for any-
body to make a speech that would express to the people the point of view of that organization?
Mr. Taft: If it contributed its own funds to get somebody to make the speech, I would say they
would violate the law." 93 CONG. REc. 6596 (1947).
4879 F. Supp. at 522.
49 id.
50 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
" Id. at 856.
52 Id.
a""Of course, a periodical financed by a corporation or labor union for the purpose of ad-
vocating legislation advantageous to the sponsor or supporting candidates whose views are be-
lieved to coincide generally with those deemed advantageous to such organization is on a different
level from newspapers devoted solely to the dissemination of news, but the line separating the two
classes is not clear." 335 U.S. at 122.




nificant amount" which Congress had not intended to be the basis of
criminal prosecution." Thus, while the court admitted that the rule of
de minimis non curat did not apply to criminal cases, this result was in
fact achieved by ruling that Congress had not intended to cover these
small sums." The court noted that under the government's interpretation,
any union employee "from its president to its janitor" could expose the
union to the risk of prosecution." If any person on the payroll of a union
spent a few hours taking people to the polls, voting, or participating in any
other type of political activity, the possibility of prosecution would exist.
The court concluded that Congress could not have intended such a result.
In these early cases, every appellate court which reached the merits of
the case commented that if the statute were interpreted literally, there
would be no doubt as to its unconstitutionality. Thus, by judicial interpre-
tation, the principle organs of union communication, union newspapers
for the larger nationals and radio and television for the smaller locals, were
exempted from the broad sweep of the statute. Furthermore, expenditures
were exempted from coverage if they were small or directly related to
such "nonpartisan" activities as voter registration. The statute was barely
alive at this point and it was to be some six years before the statute re-
ceived any support.
Later Development of Section 304. The first case to sustain an indictment
under section 304 was United States v. Auto Workers Union." The union
had been charged in district court with paying for a television broadcast in
which certain candidates for federal office were endorsed." The money for
the broadcast had come solely from union dues. The union moved to dis-
miss the indictment on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional
and, in the alternative, that the expenditures were outside the terms of the
statute. The district court, in sustaining the motion, addressed itself solely
to the latter grounds, holding the alleged actions and the facts of the
Painters case "as alike as two peas in a pod.""1 The court adopted the rea-
soning of the earlier cases in expressing doubt over the constitutionality of
the section if it were broadly interpreted. By a somewhat strained logic the
court concluded, therefore, that the statute should be narrowly interpreted
since "Congress did not intend to write an unconstitutional law.""2
On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the dismissal was
reversed. Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter traced the statute
to the early anti-corporate legislation and indicated that the purpose of
such statutes was to curb the serious effects on elections of money from
5id. at 873.
51 The court appears to have misinterpreted § 304. Although the purpose of curbing the eco-
nomic power of unions would not be substantially affected by the application of the section to
small expenditures, the section itself denotes no minimum amount to be covered and seemingly
even the smallest expenditure would constitute a violation.
'8 101 F. Supp. at 876.
59352 U.S. 567 (1957).





"those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital."" CIO wasdistinguished on the basis that the magazine was distributed only to union
members or purchasers of the magazine, and not, as here, to the public at
large. Justice Frankfurter noted: "The evil at which Congress has struck
in [section 304] is the use of corporate or union funds to influence the
public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a particular party.""
Justice Douglas dissented on the basis that union expression of views are
fully protected by the first amendment. He noted: "Until today political
expression has never been considered a crime."" s He felt that no remand was
necessary since the facts which the majority thought the lower court should
determine" were irrelevant to the constitutional issues. The Justice dis-
posed of the question of minority rights by characterizing it as involving
only the "internal management of union affairs.""7 He further indicated
that any problem of minority rights would best be solved by some other
type of statute, although he made no suggestion as to what type he con-
sidered most suitable."s
In United States v. Teamsters Local 6886 the union was indicted for
using a system whereby union members could allocate a certain portion
of their dues to political activities. It appeared that each member's dues
were the same and that these allotments did not represent extra assess-
ments. The federal district court held that such funds were voluntary
donations and thus not covered by section 304. The court did not discuss
the fact that when money is used for political purposes, the nonpolitical
activities have to be supported in greater measure by the nonparticipants.
The result is a shifting process whereby the nonparticipants have to pay
more than their share for the union's nonpolitical activities.
The most recent case to deal with union violations of section 304 was
United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council.76 In that case a union
association received contributions to a "television fund" from member
unions. These funds were used to purchase television time for a series of
programs, some of which attacked various candidates for office. The court
held that the expenditures were not covered by section 304 because (1)
they were voluntary and did not violate minority rights, and (2) television
time was the member union's only source of communication with its mem-
bers. The court ruled that because the locals voted to pay the money into
a common fund, the expenditures were voluntary. However, the court
failed to distinguish between voluntariness on the individual level and on
the individual union level. Although the locals voted to put money into
03352 U.S. 585 (1957).
64 id. at 589. The Court avoided the constitutional issues, noting that an appeal of the sustaining
of a motion to dismiss is not the setting within which to decide constitutional questions. Only
after a trial has provided a concrete factual situation can such a decision be reached.
'
5 Id. at 594.
66 (1) How large an audience did the broadcast reach? (2) Was the conduct active electioneer-
ing or simply a statement of the record? (3) Did the union intend to affect the outcome of the
election? Id. at 595-96.07 1d. at 596.
68 Id.
6941 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 16,601 (E.D. Mo. 1960).
70 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 1961).
[Vol. 23
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the "television fund," the fund was a mere conduit for money derived
from the local union. Thus, on the individual level the money was taken
from the same dissenting minority as in the previous cases of direct ex-
penditures by the union. The court further remarked that it was reason-
able for the labor council to use television to reach its members because
of the great cost of printing a newspaper."
While the statute seemed moribund at this point, some new life may have
been breathed into it by United States v. Lewis Food Co.,72 which although
it concerned a corporation,73 is directly analogous to the union situation."
Lewis Food published a list of all California legislators, state and federal,
with percentage listings of their voting in favor of "constitutional prin-
ciples.""5 The district court dismissed the indictment, holding that the ad-
vertisement represented only a publication of the voting record of the leg-
islators."0 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "a jury question was
presented as to whether the advertisement . . . was designed to influence
the public at large to vote for or against the particular candidates." 7 A
mere percentage figure based on undisclosed criteria was not "an objective
report on the voting record of public officeholders." 78 Of even greater po-
tential significance is the statement by the court that "[t]he statute itself,
however, does not provide an exception when stockholders consent.""m This
statement is an indication that even if union members voted unanimously
in favor of an expenditure, a violation has nevertheless been committed.
It is also an indication that the statute was not intended solely as a solution
to the problem of minority rights.
II. STATE LEGISLATION
At present four states have provisions banning political contributions
by labor unions. A New Hampshire statute"' provides that no gift of any
type shall be made to any organization if it is to be used in any way to
promote a candidate for political office. The Pennsylvania statute" is
broader, prohibiting any valuable thing being given or lent for "any po-
litical purpose whatsoever." The Indiana statute" is also comprehensive,
outlawing direct and indirect contributions that have the objective of in-
7 Id. at 507.
72 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966).
7' This is the only recent case the author has been able to locate dealing with corporate
violations of § 304.
"'One of the purposes of § 304 was to put unions and corporations on a par in this regard.
93 CONG. REC. 7508 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Robison). For an interesting discussion relating
unions to corporations, see G. TAYLOR, THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE: THE CORPORATE CHARACTER
OF UNIONS (1968).
7 The opinion of the district court contains a reprint of the advertisement published in some
thirty-five newspapers. United States v. Lewis Food Co., 236 F. Supp. 849, 851-52 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
7 id. at 853.
77 366 F.2d at 712.
78 Id.
71id. at 713.
80 Compare the court's statement with the role of unanimous stockholder approval in ultra
vires actions. See McQueen v. Dollar Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 579, 15 N.E.2d 529 (1938).
81 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 70, § 2 (Supp. 1967).
"
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3225 (1963).
3 1ND. ANN. STAT. S 29-5712 (1969).
1969]
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fluencing a political campaign. The New Hampshire statute has never
been interpreted by the courts of that state. Moreover, in Pennsylvania
and Indiana, the cases upholding their respective statutes have been con-
cerned only with the prohibitions against corporate expenditures. 4
The Texas statute is simple. It provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
labor union to make any financial contribution to any political party or
to any persons running for political offices as a part of the campaign ex-
penses of such individual."" This provision was part of a comprehensive
statute"8 passed in 1943 regulating the activities of labor unions. Immedi-
ately after the passage of this legislation the AFL sought a declaratory
judgment 7 that the entire statute was unconstitutional. One of the provi-
sions attacked was that relating to political contributions. In AFL v. Mann"'
the court of civil appeals held that political contributions could be out-
lawed since the free selection of governmental officials is essential to the
operation of a democratic government and such officials must represent all
the people, not just certain groups or classes. The court noted that a provi-
sion similar to the one being challenged had long been applied to corpora-
tions." It further held that the rights of the individual were not affected
since the prohibition applied only to a labor union as a "separate func-
tioning institution."'" In addition, the court noted that the statute did not
affect the union's right to inform its members of the merits or demerits
of any candidate.
A later Texas case provides an indication of an individual member's
remedy against union violations of the Texas provision. In Taylor v.
Plumbers Union"' plaintiff had been expelled from the union for failure to
pay dues. Although Taylor tendered the back dues the union would not
accept the payment unless an additional two dollar "assessment" was paid.
Taylor sought reinstatement and damages for the exclusion contending
that the union demand constituted a "void and illegal political assess-
ment."" No mention was made in the plaintiff's petition as to why the
assessment was illegal, but the court of civil appeals assumed it was because
it violated the Texas political contribution provision. Although the court
held that the claim for damages was proper, the claim for reinstatement
was abated because the plaintiff had failed to seek the remedies provided
by the union constitution. Taylor thus makes it clear that a union mem-
ber who refuses to pay that portion of dues spent for political purposes
must exhaust his intra-union remedies before turning to the courts."
84 State v. Fairbanks, 187 Ind. 648, 115 N.E. 769 (1917); In re Bechtel's Election Expenses,
39 Pa. Super. 292 (1909).
85 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a, § 4b (1962).
8Id. art. 5154a.
" Under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, TEX. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art.
2524-1 (1962).8SAFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
81 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1349-52 (1962); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 213, 214, 265
(1961).
'0 188 S.W.2d at 283.
8 337 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. 1060).
"Ild. at 422.




A few states have political contribution statutes which are no longer
operative, One state repealed its provision" and two such statutes have
been invalidated on technicalities." Only in Massachusetts has the issue of
the constitutionality of such statutes been squarely faced. In Bowe v.
Secretary" a group of voters had proposed97 the adoption of several provi-
sions regulating unions, one of which outlawed union contributions to elec-
tion campaigns. The opponents of the proposed law challenged the con-
stitutionality of the change, contending that it violated freedom of the
press as guaranteed by the Massachusetts constitution." The Massachusetts
supreme judicial court held the proposal unconstitutional and noted that
"tthe liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets."" In relating freedom of the
press to labor unions, the court concluded that this freedom is enjoyed by
associations as well as by individuals. Moreover, the prohibition against the
use of union financial resources for the expenses of printing and circulat-
ing political opinions amounted to a restriction on freedom of the press."
The court went on to note, however, that the statute could prohibit labor
unions from "dumping immense sums of money into political cam-
paigns, 19 but that such regulation was far different from an absolute
prohibition against union political contributions.
With so few reported cases, it is hard to draw any general conclusion
concerning state attempts to regulate labor union political contributions.
The paucity of cases could mean that the statutes have been effective, al-
though it probably indicates that the prohibitions are generally ignored.
Certainly there is a need for some type of state regulation, since the cov-
erage of section 304 is limited to federal elections.
III. FACING THE CURRENT PROBLEM
An examination of the cases involving section 304 reveals that the pro-
vision has been ineffective in regulating union political contributions.' 2 It is
apparent that the few state regulations have also been inadequate. Congress
and the state legislatures need to consider new legislation, keeping in mind
the twofold purpose of this type of regulation: (1) to prevent union con-
94The 1955 Wisconsin statute prohibiting campaign contributions by labor unions was re-
pealed in 1959. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 12.56 (repealed 1959). On the other hand, a similar pro-
vision relating to corporations is still in existence and was upheld in State v. Joe Must Go Club,
270 Wis. 108, 70 N.W. 681 (1955).
"2See Alabama Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810, cert. denied, 325 U.S.
450 (1945); AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944).
'0320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946).
" The forty-eighth amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution allows ten qualified voters
to initiate an election of a proposed law. MAss. CONST. ANN. amend. 48.
"MAss. CONST. ANN. Declaration of Rights art. 16.
'9 69 N.E.2d at 129.
10o The court's logic can be criticized on the ground that many political actions of labor unions
(voter registration, speeches, etc.) have nothing to do with the printed word. The court seemed
to be attempting to enlarge freedom of the press to include freedom of speech.
1'o69 N.E.2d at 130.
12 Between 1950 and 1956, the government received fifty-four complaints involving S 304,
forty-nine were investigated, fourteen were brought before grand juries, two indictments 'were
returned but no convictions resulted. Comment, Political Contributions by Labor Unions, 40
TEXAs L. REv. 665, 670 (1962).
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trol of elections; and (2) to protect minority union members from having
funds used for political purposes contrary to their wishes.
Control of Elections. Legislation designed to prevent union control of elec-
tions could take any of three forms: government subsidy, direct or indirect,
of candidate's expenses; publication of political donations; or direct limi-
tations on the size of political contributions. The first proposal would pro-
vide a broad basis of support to a candidate in order to prevent undue in-
fluence by any one group or person. There are two basic means to ac-
complish this objective-a tax incentive and a direct subsidy. Tax incen-
tive proposals would allow a person to deduct a political contribution as an
expense on his income tax return or deduct the contribution as a direct
credit to his income tax bill." 3 The size of the deduction should be limited,
however, to a figure small enough to avoid providing an advantage to
higher-income taxpayers."' A direct subsidy is not a new idea,1 °5 and such
a subsidy at one time received congressional endorsement in a modified
form." Under both forms of subsidization, sufficient funds would have
to be received by the candidate to make it unnecessary for him to rely
heavily on large contributors. However, the result of the subsidy might
be to simply move expenditures to a higher level. It is rare for a politician
not to spend everything he can get." 7 There is also the problem of what
to do about primaries, which in many states are the crucial elections. An
additional problem of direct subsidies is deciding to whom to give the
money if it is not given directly to the candidates. State political organiza-
tions are not going to be willing to have a large amount of money placed
in the hands of national officials. On the other hand, once the money is in
the hands of the local organizations it would be difficult to force funds
upward." 8
The publication of campaign expenditures and gifts has been proposed
as a means of limiting the influence of large contributors. Present federal
law concerning campaign contributions consists of provisions requiring
political committees' and individuals contributing more than $501 to
report expenditures to the Clerk of the House of Representatives. In addi-
tion, every candidate is required to account for expenditures made by
himself or by others "with his knowledge or consent,.1. and the total
103 This is an increasingly popular approach, being endorsed by former President Johnson. See
Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1, 53 (1966). See also
H. ALEXANDER, TAX INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS? (1961) for a discussion of the
techniques of various plans.
104 The proposal of the Committee for Economic Development limits the credit to $25. CED,
FINANCING A BETTER ELECTION SYsTEM 21 (1968).
" President Theodore Roosevelt proposed such a plan. 42 CONG. REC. 78 (1907).
' The Election Campaign Fund Act allows a citizen to, by checking a square on his income
tax return, contribute a dollar to a fund evenly divided between the two major political parties.
26 U.S.C. § 6096, 31 U.S.C. § 971-73 (1967). The Act is inoperative until Congress passes a bill
putting the scheme into action. Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Star. 58.
107 Sen. Barry Goldwater was an exception. He had approximately one million dollars remaining
after his presidential campaign. See Pincus, The Fight over Money, 217 ATLANTIC 71, 73 (1966).
1()H. ALEXANDER, RESPONSIBILITY IN PARTY FINANCE 31 (1963).
1002 U.S.C. § 244 (1964).
1102 U.S.C. § 245 (1964).
11.2 U.S.C. § 246 (1964).
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amount of such expenditures is limited."' However, the law is full of
loopholes: intrastate committees are excluded,"' any money spent for a
candidate without his knowledge goes unreported" 4 and no expenditures
in primaries need be reported."' Although the present law has been held
to be constitutional by the Supreme Court,"' a broader publicity statute
might be exposed to attack on the basis that the publication of an indi-
vidual's campaign contributions could be as effective in restricting free-
dom of association as the publication of a person's membership in an or-
ganization. "' However, a Florida statute... providing broad expenditure
regulations has been upheld by the highest court of that state."' Expendi-
ture regulations must be effective in forcing candidates to reveal their po-
litical expenses. As a result of such publication, the elected official must
govern his conduct carefully in order to avoid a charge of favoring the
contributing group or person.
Finally, a limitation could also be placed upon the amount of money
that unions or corporations could contribute. This is the approach sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Rutledge in CIO and by the Massachusetts court in
Bowe. A formula would have to be derived that would be fair when ap-
plied to both unions and corporations.
Protection of Minority Rights. Support for the enactment of legislation de-
signed to protect minority rights can be found in Machinists Union v.
Street,"' a case arising under the National Railway Labor Act. Street con-
cerned union shop agreements under section 2, Eleventh".' of the NRLA. A
group of employees brought an action to void the agreement, based on a
contention that dues were being used for political causes which the plain-
tiffs did not support. The trial court enjoined the enforcement of the
union shop provision."' The Supreme Court on certiorari noted that the
union shop provisions had been enacted to spread the costs of collective
bargaining fairly. The Court found that the statute was not intended to
"provide the unions with a means for forcing employees, over their objec-
tion, to support political causes which they oppose."'' . However, the Court
did not void the union shop, but suggested two remedies: an injunction to
prohibit the union from spending the amount of money extracted from
11 2 U.S.C. § 248 (1964) ($10,000 for a senatorial candidate, $2,500 for a candidate for the
House).
" Such committees are not included in the definition of "political committee." 2 U.S.C. 5
241(c) (1964).
" Unless the contributor comes under one of the other sections.
11 2 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1964).
116Burroughs v. Cannon, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
"'See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
relating to freedom of association and publication of membership in an organization. These cases
indicate that a balancing test is used, that is the greater the interest of the state in the revelation
of the membership, the more that must be revealed.
"'FLA. STAT. ANN. 5§ 99, 161(4), (5), (8), (9) (Supp. 1969).
"' Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953).
10367 U.S. 740 (1961).
"'. 45 U.S.C. S 152, Eleventh (1965). The validity of the section was upheld in Railway Em-
ployee's Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
"2'Machinists Union v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
1"3 367 U.S. at 764.
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the employee to support political activity; or a restitution suit by the
employee to recover that proportion of his dues spent for political pur-
poses. In either case a dissenting employee must notify the union of his
dissent.' The remedy was further defined in Railway Clerks Union v.
Allen" where a situation similar to Street existed. The Court held (1) a
dissenting employee must actively make known his opposition to the ex-
penditures, although he need not object to each and every specific dis-
bursement individually, (2) an order allowing the dissenting employee to
pay no dues to the union was not a proper remedy, (3) since a union has
financial records, the burden is on it to prove what proportion of expendi-
tures are nonpolitical, and (4) unions will be allowed to establish internal
plans for granting reduced dues to dissenters.
Street and Allen were based on the statutory language and legislative
history of the NRLA and as yet no court has held that similar reasoning
applies to the NLRA union shop provisions." Justices Black and Douglas
made it clear in their separate opinions in Street"7 that a union operating
under a union shop agreement may not constitutionally spend money for
political purposes over the objection of the paying member. Presumably, if
a case arose under the NLRA provisions, these two justices would hold in
favor of the dissenting member. With the recent changes in the composi-
tion of the Court, however, it may be ready for new directions. But rather
than relying on the United States Supreme Court to solve the problem,
Congress should provide a statute allowing an individual to bring an ac-
tion to recover dues spent for political purposes. As an alternative, the
union shop agreement could be voided entirely when money is spent for
political purposes. When the cost of litigation is considered in relation to
the amounts recoverable it is clear that intra-union plans for reducing dues
along the lines suggested in Allen should be encouraged. Whatever the
scheme, it is doubtful whether it could constitutionally apply to states with
"right-to-work" laws, since membership in the union is purely voluntary.
States with these laws should thus be exempted from the operation of any
statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Present attempts to control union participation in politics have largely
failed. On the federal level, section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act has been
interpreted so that the main organs of union communication have been
exempted and the courts have repeatedly held that if the statute were
interpreted literally, it would be unconstitutional. Furthermore, the state
statutes, most of which are modeled after federal law, have apparently
been largely ignored. The need is apparent for statutes more closely related
1141d. at 744-75.
12'373 U.S. 113 (1963).
.. 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(3) (1965). See DeMille v. Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d
769, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948), where a union member refused to pay a special assessment
that was being used to fight a proposal for a right-to-work law. It was held members were bound
by the will of the majority and that they could work for the defeat of the proposal if they wished.
1'367 U.S. at 775 (Douglas, J.); 367 U.S. at 779 (Black, J.).
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to the desired objectives. Clearly, some of the legislation discussed above
is more suited to a federal law than state legislation, particularly the tax
incentive programs. But since Congress has shown a reluctance to regulate
state elections, state laws are necessary to fill the resulting gap.
The best proposal for limiting labor's political influence would appear
to be the direct limitation on labor contributions for political purposes. A
federal law could limit contributions by a labor organization for all polit-
ical purposes to a specified figure per member. This could include spending
for any political purposes, including contributions to state elections. Such
a proposal could be combined with more rigid reporting requirements for
individuals or organizations receiving support. But more important is the
protection of minority rights. Labor unions should be required to establish
a system, within broad legislative guidelines, for reimbursing dissenting
employees. The system should be designed so that reimbursement would be
a simple, expedient procedure. The National Labor Relations Board and
state labor boards would have to police the system to insure its proper
functioning. A two-pronged effort to limit labor's political influence and
protect minority rights should come much closer to meeting the objectives
of section 304 and the various state laws than the present legislation.
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